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FE - Mr. Peake

April 10, 1951.

CA - Mr. Clubb

Comments on Estimate of the Effectiveness of Anti-Communist Guerrilla Operations in China (DM-10-1951)

CA submits herewith its comments with respect to the report by the Joint Intelligence Committee to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on estimate of the effectiveness of anti-Communist guerrilla operations in China.

The following statement of assumption is not entirely clear: "This paper therefore explores primarily the military aspects of the problem and does not consider the long-range political implications of such actions." It is not certain whether this statement means that the paper proposes to attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of anti-Communist guerrilla operations in China without considering the question of political and ideological leadership of such operations. While it would be possible doubtless to estimate the number of dissident forces now operating in China without consideration of this question, we believe it entirely impossible to estimate the present or future effectiveness of dissident forces without considering this question. The Joint Intelligence Committee points out in paragraph 9 of Annex A that "It is held as an axiom that guerrilla forces cannot operate against conventional forces in the midst of a hostile populace, can achieve only mediocre success among an apathetic populace, and can be fully effective only with active popular support." It seems apparent from this that the question of political and ideological leadership is of critical importance in evaluating actual and potential guerrilla effectiveness. Paragraph 9 c emphasizes the political and ideological apathy of the great mass of the Chinese people. However, it is worth noting that the Chinese Communists were able to conduct successful guerrilla operations throughout large areas of China over an extended period of time. This suggests that, notwithstanding their apathy, the Chinese people are not totally deaf to political and ideological appeal. The history of China actually bears out this conclusion.

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The subject paper states (conclusions, paragraph 2): "Outside leadership and organization would probably improve cohesion and control but should not be expected greatly to increase the number of personnel. External political and ideological pressures would have relatively little effect." It is not clear whether the Joint Intelligence Committee in referring to "outside leadership and organization" and "external political and ideological pressures" has in mind Chinese direction and leadership, or foreign direction and leadership. If foreign direction and leadership is meant, CA would concur. If, however, Chinese direction and leadership is meant, CA would disagree with the conclusion stated above, because in its view the character and nature of the Chinese leadership would have a most important bearing upon the number of personnel and the overall effectiveness of guerrilla operations.

In short, CA believes that political leadership and ideological content of any resistance movement would be a critical factor affecting the strength of such movement and that failure to consider fully this factor is a major deficiency in the subject paper.

Paragraph 2 of Annex A discusses the numerical strength of anti-Communist forces now active on the mainland. While this is of importance, it should be emphasized that the numerical strength of resistance at any given time is not so important as the state of the people's "rice bowl", the attitude of the people toward the authorities, the type and degree of outside stimulation and support, and the violence and efficiency of internal repressive measures.

It is noted that the paper does not mention the various secret societies in China. These societies in certain areas of China have traditionally played an important part in resistance movements and revolutionary activities.

In CA's view it is a mistake to approach the related problems of guerrilla activities and a resistance movement in China from a predominently military point of view, as this paper seems to do. The concept of a maximum of

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300,000 effectives should in our opinion, be replaced by the concept of a unified resistance movement under Chinese leadership and direction with a strong ideological program. In such circumstances it is impossible to estimate the number of effectives, which would depend upon the quality of the political leadership and the quality of the ideological program, and it would be incorrect to dismiss as unimportant the "Class C" dissidents listed in paragraph 8 c since it is from this group that the active or tacit support of the civil populace would be drawn, and it is this group which might be expected to provide the major source of new recruits.

Similarly, under circumstances set forth above, it would be relatively unimportant whether participating individuals or groups were pro-Western or anti-Western in orientation: the major American objective is to cause a shift of China from the Stalinist camp, and this objective can be achieved, it is considered, only by a force which is basically nationalistic (i.e., Chinese) and Asiatic in its orientation and philosophy. An "American" movement in China logically has much less chance of success than one which is purely Chinese.

The "Class B" forces (paragraph 8 b) would seem to have a place in at least the initial phases of such a resistance movement.

Finally, in CA's view, the essentially military approach of the Joint Intelligence Committee to this whole question leads it to overly optimistic conclusions respecting "Class A" guerrilla forces (paragraph 8 a). CA would question the statement "nominally at least, they remain loyal to the Nationalist Government and it might reasonably be expected that given logistical support they would, after some purging of unreliable personnel and reorganization of units, fight effectively as directed by that Government." The history of the Nationalist Government's military and political operations does not support such a statement, projecting that Class A guerrillas would fight effectively, particularly in the light of the statement in paragraph 9(a).

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